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Liquidity and asset prices: a VECM approach 
  Attila Ács 
The recent financial and economic crisis highlighted the importance to better understand the 
relationship between liquidity developments and asset price movements. Central banks with 
focus on inflation targeting allowed asset price inflation, following burst, with its devastating 
consequences for the financial system and real economy. Equilibrium price should emanate 
from fundamentals. However liquidity conditions are part of fundamental variables and should 
be taken into consideration as explanatory variables in the process of asset pricing. 
Furthermore in many cases assets serve as collateral in refinancing which means that 
refinancing conditions influence values of pledged assets. 
Keywords: liquidity, asset pricing, broker dealer, repo, error correction 
1. Introduction 
Low and stable inflation supports financial stability, it also add to the probability that excess demand 
show up first in credit aggregates and asset prices, sooner than in the prices of goods and services. By 
anchoring expectations and hence inducing greater stickiness in prices and wages can lessen the 
inflationary pressures emanating from increased demand. Consequently, in certain situations, a 
response by the monetary authorities to credit and asset markets can be motivated to safeguard both 
financial and monetary stability (Borio and Lowe, 2002). 
2. Relevant literature, liquidity variables 
At the eruption of the financial crisis the notion of funding liquidity frequently was pointed out in 
relation to asset prices. The funding or balance sheet liquidity is the ability of a financial institution to 
settle obligations with immediacy (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2009). This inherently supposes that 
funding conditions should be an intrinsic part of asset and financial stability valuation process. In the 
midst of rapidly evolving financial theory not surprisingly there are difficulties with the identification 
of liquidity and as a consequence with its measurement. To find relationship between asset prices and 
monetary or credit aggregates seems appealing but only after the recent financial crisis arrived 
satisfactory answer.  
The non-interest-bearing fiat money is simply the outcome of a liquidity shortage, not a logical 
requirement. In the future money may ultimately disappear owing to ultra-liquid, privately-issued 
securities that earn interest. In this view, Monetary Economics should be displaced by Liquidity 
Economics. Money has no intrinsic value and people are willing to hold because they find it difficult 
to barter. Money is accepted because it’s been believed that would be accepted it in the future. That is 
mutually-sustaining beliefs are indispensable to its acceptance and existence (Kiyotaki and Moore, 
2001). As fiat money is not interest bearing everybody who holds it faces opportunity cost. A kind of 
hot potato affect is a characteristic of fiat money - that is nobody desires to hold for a sustained period 
– which urge economic agents to exchange it for interest bearing assets. Ceteris paribus more money 
leads to increased demand for assets.  
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Continuous rapid credit growth together with huge increases in asset prices seems to increase the 
possibility of an occurrence of financial instability. However rapid credit growth, on its own, creates 
modest risk to the stability of the financial system. The same is true for quick growths in asset prices 
or investments. It is the combination of events, particularly the synchronized happening of fast credit 
growth and rapid increases in asset prices and that increases the likelihood of financial risk, rather than 
any one of these events alone (Borio and Lowe, 2002). 
Studies ahead of the recent financial crisis predominantly used money and credit aggregates to explain 
asset price developments, e.g. Detken and Smets (2004), Wyplosz (2005). Baks and Kramer (1999) 
computed growth rate in broad and narrow money to generate global liquidity indictors for the G-7 
countries. Borio et al. (1994) examined the link between credit and asset prices, trying to identify an 
indicator of future movements in output and inflation and to determine the demand for money. Borio 
and Lowe (2002) highlighted the importance of cumulative effects of credit growth. This approach is 
understandable as before the monetary policy shifted to inflation targeting during 80’s and 90’s central 
banks pursued monetary targeting regime.  
Main feature of the development of financial systems since the 1970s has been the rapid expansion of 
financial markets. The importance of liquidity has been acknowledged by central banks in respect to 
both monetary and financial stability. This is reflected in market-oriented operating procedures and the 
intense use of asset prices as a guide for monetary policy. For example, yield curves are commonly 
used to extract information about market participants’ expectations concerning inflation. This process 
depends crucially on the liquidity of the underlying market, namely the treasury and bond market. In 
case of financial stability central banks use asset prices in the monitoring of vulnerabilities in the 
financial system, as they include information about market participants’ assessment and risk pricing 
(Borio, 2000). 
Classical monetary and credit aggregates do not fully cover market participants’ aggregated ability to 
buy assets. The studies mentioned above measured liquidity in monetary aggregates but liquidity is 
something more. Monetary aggregates measure the liabilities of deposit-taking banks, and so may 
have been useful before the advent of the so called market-based financial system. Market-based 
institutions (broker-dealers, investment banks) overtook the dominant role in the supply of credit from 
commercial banks. These market-based financial institutions were deeply involved in securitisation 
and actively used capital and financial markets to satisfy their funding needs. This way market-based 
liabilities such as repos and commercial paper are better indicators of credit conditions that influence 
the economy. As a result there is a case for restore a role for balance sheet quantities in the conduct of 
monetary policy. From the point of view of financial stability measures of collateralized borrowing, 
such as the weekly series of primary dealer repos can prove very useful. This changing nature of 
finance is reflected by the aggregate balance sheet of market-based financial intermediaries which in 
2007 reached 17.000 trillion of dollars compared to commercial banks 13.000 trillion (Adrian and 
Shin, 2008).  
Repurchase agreement (repo) is a form of money (private/inside money), like demand deposits but for 
institutional investors and nonfinancial firms. These companies require ready access to cash should the 
need arise, a way to safely storage and some interest. In a repo deal a “depositor” (e.g. money market 
funds) deposits money at a financial institution (e.g. investment bank, broker-dealer) and receives 
collateral, valued at market prices. The contract is short term (typically overnight), which means the 
depositor can withdraw the money at any time by not renewing or rolling the repo. The deposits 
supported by assets (e.g. bonds, ABS) as collateral obtained from the institution where the fund is 
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deposited. In banking crises available money from repo markets disappear, liquidity dries up because 
of a loss of confidence (Gorton and Metrick, 2010). 
To protect against losses in case of default of borrower lenders apply a so called haircut on pledged 
assets, which is the difference between the current market price of the security and the price at which it 
is sold. The system of repurchase agreement is built on trust of the value of the underlying asset. If 
case of questioning the value of collateralised assets, the trust evaporates from the markets resulting in 
higher haircuts. A haircut addresses the risk that if the holder of the bond in repo, the depositor, has to 
sell a bond in the market to get the cash bank, he may face a better informed trader resulting in a loss 
(relative to the true value of the security). This risk is endogenous to the trading practice, which is not 
the danger of loss due to default. As a result, the price cannot adjust to address this risk. One way to 
protect against this endogenous adverse selection risk is to require overcollateralization (Gorton and 
Metrick, 2010). 
Principal determinant of available funding to leveraged institutions is the variation of the haircut size, 
since the haircut determines the maximum possible leverage (ratio of assets to equity) for investors 
(Adrian and Shin, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). 
Higher haircuts may come from increased market volatility which means uncertainty about the 
collateral value. Decreasing assets values mean lower amount of money available from repo which 
circumstance adds additional pressure to asset prices. To put it differently there is procyclicality 
between liquidity and asset prices. 
It is true that risk emanating from repo is limited by collateral but repo is not free of counterparty risk. 
Collateral pricing in case of default can be uncertain, and illiquidity and volatility in the secondary 
markets for this collateral can induce large transactions costs. In this case, measures of bank-
counterparty risk may be relevant to lenders, set as the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-
month OIS (Gorton and Metrick, 2009).  
Haircuts, volatility, counterparty risk, and short term refinancing creates funding liquidity risk. 
Information about aggregate funding liquidity risk can be learned by observing the bidding behaviour 
of banks during open market operations. The method observes the sum of the premium banks are 
willing to pay above the expected marginal rate (i.e. the expected interest rate which will clear the 
auction) times the bidding volume, and normalised by the expected amount of money supplied by the 
central bank. The obtained tool named liquidity risk insurance premia (LRP) which shows strong 
negative interrelationship with market liquidity. In this sense higher funding liquidity risk implies 
lower market liquidity (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2010).  
About the repo market it is important to mention that simply there is not enough AAA, highest rated 
debt in the world to satisfy demand (Fitch, 2011), so the banking system is under pressure to create 
supply. The prime reason is the rapid growth of money under management by institutional investors, 
pension funds, mutual funds. These entities need large amount of cash at hand, which earns interest, a 
safe investment, while offering the flexibility to use cash, in short, a demand deposit-like product. As a 
consequence the range of assets eligible for repo widened and haircuts got extremely low (Gorton and 
Metrick, 2010). As a response to the demand, the financial industry created new structures and 
produced new instruments that seemed to offer higher risk-adjusted yields. In this background, market 
discipline failed as optimism triumphed, due diligence was outsourced to third party credit rating 
agencies Low interest rates amid high price growth and low volatility urged investors around the world 
to look for yield further down the credit quality curve resulting in overoptimistic risk evaluation 
(IMF, 2009). 
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Figure 1/a: broker-dealers’ balance sheet, M2  Figure 1/b: broker-dealer leverage 
   
Source: Federal Reserve 
3. Considerations 
These paragraphs are built around relevant concept like refinancing conditions (collateral, repo, and 
haircut), maturity transformation and yield curve. Market participants’ aggregated asset purchasing 
capacity and liquidity conditions are determined by the interaction between these factors. It is the 
combination of events which really matters rather than any factor independently and broker-dealers’ 
aggregated balance sheet gives a good synthesis of liquidity conditions in general. But obviously 
factors can be investigated one by one more profoundly. This section offers reflections which can be 
used as starting points of a more profound research of the independent variables.  
Development of broker-dealer leverage1 is displayed in Figure 1/b which demonstrates that large 
decreases in broker-dealer leverage are associated with times of macroeconomic and financial sector 
turmoil (see the peeks at 2001Q3 and 2008Q3). In Figure 1/a the development of M2 monetary 
aggregate and broker-dealers’ aggregated balance sheet is presented, both normalised to 1984Q1. The 
growing importance of broker dealers can be understood if the enormous size of their balance sheet is 
taken in consideration (17.000 trillion of dollars).  
Refinancing by the use of repo is a universally used practice among investment companies. But repo 
usually is short term which exposes investors to refinancing risk frequently (daily, weekly, monthly). 
This also means that investors’ reaction functions are similar and are not independent from each other. 
Similarity creates forces which move into the same direction at the same time exposing the financial 
system to stress events. The use of repo among US broker dealers gained popularity from the 
beginning on 90s and was the main driver of balance sheet for 3 years from 2004Q2 till 2007Q3.  
If certain type of assets serve as collateral in refinancing it means that refinancing conditions influence 
values of pledged asset. Haircuts are different for different asset classes so ceteris paribus assets with 
lower haircut and higher revenue are more valuable as they afford higher leverage and potential profit. 
The availability of borrowable funds makes possible for investors to buy assets in addition to their 
capital exploiting the potential in leverage.  
The notion of “collateral bubble” illuminates clearly one of the major sources of the recent financial 
crisis. Overly optimistic (imprudent) valuations cause not only asset bubble but as a consequence 
inflate collateral values too, emphasising the twofold role of assets as investments and collaterals. In 
                                                     
1
 Accounting leverage is calculated as the difference between total assets and total liabilities divided by total 
assets. 
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case of crisis (or illumination) not only investors or speculators lose money but also creditors as 
collaterals with decreased value do not offer enough counter-value in case of the borrowers’ default. 
The collateral bubble phenomenon causes procyclicality in the economy. The importance of the 
collateral issue in lending practices was highlighted by Borio et al. in 2001. The aggregate value of 
collateral to GDP can be an important issue to measure procyclicality. If in bank lending process the 
risks emanating from collateral are incorrectly assessed than the possibility of large credit cycles is 
increased (Borio et al., 2001). 
Investors buy discounted future cash-flows represented by assets like bonds, commercial papers, 
stocks2. The trigger of the recent financial crisis was the loss of confidence in asset cash-flows 
(namely asset backed securities). The confidence in assets and collateral values and counterparties’ 
solvency plunged very quickly from extreme highs resulting in increasing haircuts and narrowing 
circle of assets eligible for repurchase agreement. The consequence can be involuntary leverage as 
precipitating asset values wipe out leveraged borrowers’ capital faster than they can reduce leveraged 
positions. This is precisely what happened in 2008 when broker dealers’ accounting leverage reached 
nearly value of 100. 3 
By means maturity transformation and carry trade leverage can become more intense. In this sense a 
distinction can be made on two basic strategies: carry trade and maturity transformation. Carry trade 
attempts to capitalise on the difference of two interest rate environment; typically borrows money in a 
low-interest rate currency and buys higher-yielding assets in a different currency. This strategy is 
characteristic of investment banks.4 
Maturity transformation takes advantage of the yield curve. The core of maturity transformation is the 
positively sloped (normal) yield curve, which means that shorter term investments (deposits, 
treasuries) earn lower interest rate than longer term ones (loans, mortgages, bonds). Steeper yield 
curve means higher profits from maturity transformation and flattening yield curve ceteris paribus 
decreasing the earning capacity of the financial industry. 5 
Though, distinction between two types of maturity transformation has to be made: liquidity 
transformation and interest rate risk transformation. Both build on the different market liquidity of 
long and short term assets. Longer terms assets are less liquid and are traded with interest rate 
premium. While the former one used typically by broker-dealers and assumes liquidity risk, the latter 
transformation involves the classical commercial banks which assume interest rate risk. 
Financial institutions taking part in maturity transformation take on interest rate risk, including 
changes in rates of greater magnitude (e.g., up and down 300 and 400 basis points) across different 
tenors to reflect changing slopes and twists of the yield curve (FDIC, 2010). This risk affects 
investment and commercial banks which creates similarities in reaction functions. 
These days excessively low long term interest rates creates risk factors as they are so small that it isn’t 
worthwhile to invest. This situation firstly creates impetus to accept lower quality debt as collateral in 
                                                     
2
 I would call this funding liquidity, namely raise cash against collateral. 
3
 Economic leverage would be more informative about the real risk size however it depends on model 
assumptions regarding correlations (and volatilities) which in stressful times usually breaks down. Furthermore it 
would require information about the size and direction (short or long) of positions. 
4
 Carry trade usually entails high risk due to open exchange rate positions or involves exchange rate hedge by us 
of expensive derivatives. 
5
 Not by chance an inverted yield curve always portended the stagnation of the US economy as between these 
conditions the profitability of banking activity got under serious pressure. 
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repo transactions. Secondary it creates liquidity overhang urging the acquisition of riskier, less liquid, 
worse quality assets and present impetus for carry trade. This situation seems alarming in the midst of 
quantity easing an fragile economic and financial developments. 
4. Empirical Research 
In relation to factors influencing liquidity conditions different asset prices like stock, bonds can be 
investigated. Research direction is not straightforward. To begin with, money originating from a repo 
transaction can be used to buy different type of assets like bonds, stock, treasuries or asset-backed 
securities as well. The source of liquidity does not tell anything about the destination of the fund 
received. Secondly, money obtained in one county can be invested in a different country exploiting the 
potential in carry trade (liquidity spill-over effect). Of course there may be other patterns. 
4.1. The dataset 
The time span of investigation based on the change in the course of US monetary policy regime. In the 
Volker era happened the passing from monetary targeting regime to inflation targeting) which period 
was highlighted by great volatilities. Thus the time series start in 1984 Q1 and end in 2011 Q2 and are 
based on quarterly observations.  
This research investigates the effect of the newly discovered measure of liquidity, namely broker-
dealers’ aggregated balance sheet (BDA), on assets. The explaining variables of liquidity apart from 
broker-dealers’ or investment banks’ aggregated balance sheet is broader M2 monetary aggregate6 and 
gross national product (GDP). The variables under investigation are: S&P500 index (SX) representing 
price of the US stocks, treasury bond rate (10 year treasury bonds) and 3 months treasury rate standing 
for bond (B10) and treasury prices (T3) respectively – though the interpretation of these rates can be 
manifold. The data source for M2, BDA, T3 and B10 is the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, 
for SX the Yahoo Finance and for GDP the Bureau of Economic Analysis. M2, BDA, GDP and SX 
time series were transformed logarithmically.  
4.2. Methodology  
A Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) been identified7 for the economy of the United States as 
variables in case of US economy are easily available. VEC model has been chosen as it allows 
identification of long and short term relationships between variables. The core of VECM is 
cointegration which tested by the Johansen maximum likelihood procedure. In estimating the 
cointegration first has to be checked whether each of the series is integrated of the same order. 
Integration of a time series can be confirmed by the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and 
Phillips-Perrons unit root tests. The number of cointegration ranks (r) is tested with the maximum 
eigenvalue and trace test. The maximum eigenvalue statistics test the null hypothesis that there are r 
cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r+1 cointegrating vectors. The trace statistics tests the 
null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector against the alternative of at least one cointegrating vector. 
The asymptotic critical values are given in Johansen (1991) and MacKinnonet al. (1999). 
                                                     
6
 The Fed stopped reporting values for M3 at the end of 2005. 
7
 Jmulti and Eviews programs were used. 
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4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
A summary of descriptive statistics of the variable can be found in Table 1. Sample mean, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis, and the Jacque-Bera statistic and p-value have been reported. The 
relatively high standard deviation of B10 and T3 with respect to the mean is an indication of high price 
volatility of the traded items. According to the Jarque-Bera test the null hypothesis that the variables 
are normally distributed is acceptable only in case of T3. 
All of the six time-series are integrated of order one as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test display 
evidence of nonstationarity at levels but first differences are stationary at 5% significance level. 
Consistent with Figure 2, we conclude that all the variables are I (1). 
4.4. VAR analysis, residual test 
The selection of the optimal lag length was based on an auxiliary Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. 
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Final Prediction Error (FPE) statistics propose a lag length of order 6, 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistics propose a lag length of order 8, while Schwarz Criterion 
(SC) and Hannan–Quinn (HQ) criterion offer to use lag order one and two respectively.  
The Lagrange multiplier (LM) test revealed presence of residual autocorrelation with all of the 
proposed leg length. To ensure normality, dummies were created based on the economic calendar and 
the graphs of the standardized residuals, which have revealed a couple of large outliers. Three blip 
dummy variables were created with values 1 at 87Q4, 01Q3 and 08Q4 and zeros otherwise. The 3 
dummy represent 3 extreme events: the black Friday on the stock exchange, the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001 (and aftermath of the Enron scandal) and the recent financial crisis. By the use of 
these dummies with length of 4 the hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation can be accepted with 
fairly high confidence level (Table 2). The SC has tendency to underestimate the lag order, while 
adding more lags increases the penalty for the loss of degrees of freedom. AIC, SC, HQ is based on the 
maximal value of the likelihood function with an additional penalizing factor related to the number of 
estimated parameters (Juselius, 2003, p. 78). Thus the use of 4 lags is rationalised.  
The normality tests are based on skewness and kurtosis. The tests show that the null of the tests, 
normally distributed errors, is not accepted in the multivariate case and for all individual time series 
aside from the treasury rate. Normality test of residuals is rejected due to kurtosis but normality of 
skewness is accepted at 72% confidence level. These test results are acceptable because it has shown 
that kurtosis is less serious than skewness (Juselius, 2003, p. 76). 
Additionally, test of heteroscedasticity, signs for ARCH effects (the hypothesis of no ARCH effect can 
be accepted only at 1.3% confidence level). However, cointegration tests are robust against moderate 
residual ARCH effects (Juselius, 2003, p. 51). Since most test statistics are accepted, the model seems 
to describe the data well. 
4.5. Cointegration test 
Consider a VAR system of order p where y represents a vector of variables with 𝑘 = 𝑛, 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2+. . . +𝐴𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑢𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a vector of non-stationary I(1) variables and the 𝐴𝑖’s are (𝑛 × 𝑛) coefficient matrices and 
𝑢𝑡 = (𝑢1𝑡, 𝑢2𝑡, … , 𝑢𝑛𝑡) is an unobservable i.i.d. zero mean error term or innovations. It can be 
reparameterized by adding and subtracting 𝐴𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑘+1 from the right hand side: 
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 Δ𝑦𝑡 = −Πyt−1 + ∑ Φ𝑖Δ𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑛−1
𝑖=1  (2) 
where, 
 Π = (𝐼 − ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) and Φ𝑖 = −(∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1 ) = −𝐴 ∗ (𝐿) (3) 
Using exogenous dummy or exogenous variables 𝐷, Δ𝑦𝑡 can be expressed with the following form: 
 Δ𝑦𝑡 = Π𝑦𝑡−1 + Γ1Δ𝑦𝑡−1 +Φ𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (4) 
If the characteristic polynomial in Δ𝑦𝑡 
Π(𝜆) = 𝐼𝑝 − 𝜆Π1 − 𝜆
2Π2 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐼𝑝 − Π𝜆 − Γ1𝜆(1 − 𝜆) (or the companion matrix) has unit root, 
then |Π(𝜆)| = 0 fpr 𝜆 = 1 and Π(1)=−Π = −𝛼𝛽′. And the ECM model becomes: 
 Δ𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽
′𝑦𝑡−1 + Γ1Δ𝑦𝑡−1 +Φ𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (5) 
Granger’s representation theorem asserts that if the coefficient matrix 𝛱 has reduced rank 𝑟 <  𝑘, then 
there exist a k x r matrices α and β each with rank r such that 𝛱 =  𝛼𝛽’ and 𝛽’𝑦𝑡 is 𝐼(0). 𝑟 is the 
number of cointegrating relations (the cointegrating rank) and each column of β is the cointegrating 
vector. As explained below, the elements of 𝛼 are known as the adjustment parameters in the VEC 
model. Johansen’s method is to estimate the 𝛱 matrix from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether 
we can reject the restrictions implied by the reduced rank of 𝛱. 
By the use of VECM model several effects can be examined. The 𝛽𝑖𝑗 coefficients show the long run 
equilibrium relationships between levels of variables. The 𝛼𝑖𝑗 coefficients show the amount of changes 
in the variables that bring the system back to equilibrium. Γ𝑖𝑗 coefficients show the short run changes 
occurring due to previous changes in the variables and Φ𝑖𝑗 coefficients show the effect on the 
dynamics of external events. 
4.6. Empirical results 
Johansen Cointegration test indicates mixed results about the number of cointegration. The number of 
cointegration ranks (r) is tested with the maximum eigenvalue and trace test. The maximum 
eigenvalue statistics test the null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors against the alternative 
of r+1 cointegrating vectors. The trace statistics tests the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector 
against the alternative of at least one cointegrating vector. The asymptotic critical values are given in 
Johansen (1991) and MacKinnon et al. (1999).  
The level data sets have clear linear trends but about the intercepts of cointegrating equation(s) (CE) 
nothing can be told. Accordingly the Johansen test performed with the optimal lag length of 4 and with 
and without the intercepts of cointegrating equation(s). In both cases one or two CEs at the 0.05 level 
is signalled by trace test and maximum eigenvalue test, however in case of trend assumption in the CE 
the presence of 2 CEs is accepted by the maximum eigenvalue and only borderline declined by Trace 
Test. Thus the use VECM is motivated. 
The graphs of the cointegrating relations of the unrestricted model can be seen on Figure 3. The two 
graphs show persistent behaviour and strongly suggest mean-reversion behaviour and look fairly 
stationary (Figure 3). As a result, this indicator points to a rank of 2. Figure 4 depicts the recursively 
calculated log-likelihood which provides further information on parameter constancy and confirms a 
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constant parameter regime. As a result, the assumption of constant parameters, which is important for 
valid identification of the long-run structure, is fulfilled. 
The t statistics of the parameters (Table 4) are significant (value close to1.9) at least in one of the two 
cointegarting equation which gives evidence of considerable evidence of long term relationship 
between money variables and asset prices. 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper to prove evidence of remarkable relationship between asset prices and 
monetary developments, with special focus on broker dealer balance sheet, is reached by the 
identification of the cointegrating equations. Coefficient restrictions and detailed interpretation of the 
results is not intended by this paper. 
Cointegration between non-stationary data series represents the statistical expression of the economic 
notion of a long-run economic relation. Co-integration analysis makes possible to check for various 
long-run relations in the data that can help to improve the understanding of the relationship between 
money and asset prices (Wiedmann, 2011, p. 55, 56). Parameters with significant t statistics of the 
(Table 4) proves the connection and especially the relevant information content of broker dealers’ 
balance sheet 
In a future research coefficient restrictions, identification of the long-run structures, short-run 
dynamics and the long-run impact of the common trends can be the next step forward. Relevant input 
data connected to this tread of study can be other monetary aggregates (M1, M3), volatility indices 
(VIX), repurchase agreement statistics (collateral value, haircut), measure of counterparty risk 
(LIBOR-OIS spread, Gorton and Metrick, 2009), or measure of funding liquidity risk (LRP, Drehmann 
and Nikolaou, 2010).  
Additional variables under investigation can be assets like real estate, stock or derivatives. Further 
explanatory variables can be inflation, productivity or unemployment data, interbank money market 
conditions, market liquidity indexes (bid-offer spread, market depth, resilience, immediacy) financial 
innovation, accounting rules, regulatory capital rules. 
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Appendix 
Figure 2: The graph of the variables 
 
 
Figure 3: the cointegating relations 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of variables 
  B10 T3 LM2 LSX LBDA LGDP 
 Mean 6.284955 4.475405 15.29066 6.461711 13.38164 9.009552 
 Median 5.96 4.92 15.19418 6.703532 13.52624 9.037165 
 Maximum 13.56 10.8 16.02344 7.330897 14.99239 9.616658 
 Minimum 2.42 0.03 14.56961 5.031614 11.22244 8.212867 
 Std. Dev. 2.347868 2.618038 0.407104 0.693861 1.091384 0.41734 
 Skewness 0.805798 0.027878 0.206121 -0.471398 -0.288999 -0.185444 
 Kurtosis 3.381779 2.425087 1.874666 1.850847 1.801361 1.798972 
  
     
  
 Jarque-Bera 12.68637 1.543054 6.642975 10.21855 8.19002 7.307623 
 Probability 0.001759 0.462307 0.036099 0.00604 0.016656 0.025892 
  
     
  
 Sum 697.63 496.77 1697.263 717.25 1485.362 1000.06 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 606.3734 753.9538 18.23074 52.95878 131.0231 19.15902 
  
     
  
 Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111 
 
Table 3. VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM 
Tests 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 02/01/12 Time: 14:18   
Sample: 1984Q1 2011Q2   
Included observations: 107   
  
  
  
Lags LM-Stat Prob   
  
  
  
1 44.21763 0.1634   
2 45.24496 0.1389   
3 40.72389 0.2703   
4 42.50861 0.2111   
5 44.3219 0.1608   
6 32.48261 0.6367   
7 28.19775 0.8201   
8 27.14324 0.8563   
9 19.73547 0.9873   
  
  
  
Probs from chi-square with 36 df. 
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Table 4. Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Vector Error Correction Estimates       
 Date: 02/01/12 Time: 12:55 
   
  
 Sample (adjusted): 1984Q4 2011Q2 
  
  
 Included observations: 107 after adjustments 
 
  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
  
  
  
     
  
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2 
   
  
  
     
  
LBDA(-1) 1 0 
   
  
  
     
  
T3(-1) 0 1 
   
  
  
     
  
B10(-1) 0.54124 -2.08814 
   
  
  -0.07577 -0.17273 
   
  
  [ 7.14273] [-12.0893] 
  
  
  
     
  
LM2(-1) 2.277849 -5.65699 
   
  
  -1.29969 -2.9626 
   
  
  [ 1.75261] [-1.90946] 
  
  
  
     
  
LSX(-1) 1.16397 -1.2826 
   
  
  -0.42176 -0.9614 
   
  
  [ 2.75977] [-1.33410] 
  
  
  
     
  
LGDP(-1) -6.51801 -24.4881 
   
  
  -2.72467 -6.21081 
   
  
  [-2.39222] [-3.94282] 
  
  
  
     
  
@TREND(83Q4) 0.033754 0.358443 
   
  
  -0.03466 -0.079 
   
  
  [ 0.97390] [ 4.53701] 
   
  
  
     
  
C -2.26557 303.9369 
   
  
  
     
  
Error Correction: D(LBDA) D(T3) D(B10) D(LM2) D(LSX) D(LGDP) 
  
     
  
CointEq1 0.031322 -0.75322 -0.59437 0.005895 -0.06171 -0.00392 
  -0.02803 -0.177 -0.15596 -0.00165 -0.02476 -0.00159 
  [ 1.11761] [-4.25556] [-3.81104] [ 3.57253] [-2.49173] [-2.47459] 
  
     
  
CointEq2 -0.01856 -0.11203 0.161822 0.001875 0.001162 -0.00106 
  -0.00983 -0.06208 -0.0547 -0.00058 -0.00869 -0.00056 
  [-1.88860] [-1.80467] [ 2.95843] [ 3.24078] [ 0.13380] [-1.91198] 
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Figure 4. Recursivelly clculated eigenvalues 
 
 
